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THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF
MARY ANN GLENDON

Donald P. Kommers*
Mary Ann Glendon is an accomplished legal scholar whose books
and essays in the field of marriage and family law have received universal acclaim among her peers in the legal academy. More recently,
and particularly in the last decade, she has emerged as a notable public intellectual. In this capacity, she has focused her careful reflections
on topics such as abortion, religious liberty, social welfare legislation,
the changing nature of the legal profession, and the condition of
political discourse in America. One of the things that makes her recent work, as well as her earlier publications on family law, so relevant
politically and so insightful intellectually is the international and comparative perspective that she brings to it. By comparing American
legal trends with those of other countries, she offers her readers a
clarifying lens through which to obtain a better understanding of
these developments and, of equal importance, their relationship to
the creation of a vibrant democracy and a caring civil society.
I'd like to begin with a brief overview of Professor Glendon's publications on family law because they constitute the best example of her
general approach to the analysis of law and its impact on society. After commenting on what she considers to be the constitutional implications of this work, I move on to publications in which she addresses
constitutional issues more directly. In this brief and selective account,
I can only hope that I have properly understood her concerns and
communicated a sense of the subtlety and complexity of her
constitutionalism.
* Professor of Law and Joseph and Elizabeth Robbie Professor of Government
and International Studies, University of Notre Dame. BA. Catholic University of
American 1954; MA. Wisconsin-Madison 1958; Ph.D. Wisconsin-Madison 1962; LL.D.
Heidelberg University (Germany) 1998. MichaelJ. Edney deserves my thanks for his
help in collecting Mary Ann Glendon's publications. For their comments on an
earlier version of this paper, I am grateful to Robert E. Rodes, Jr. and Thomas C.
Kohler.
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I
Mary Ann Glendon's work on family law provides us with impressive models of both comparative and normative legal scholarship.
What is more, her claims are as modest as her prescriptions are discriminating. A devoted comparativist, she nevertheless recognizes the
limits of comparative knowledge in recommending improvements in
American law. Concerned with the morality of law, she also avoids
moralism in her statements about law's failings. Later in this essay, I
characterize Glendon's approach as moral realism, an approach that
pays close attention to cultural differences in her comparative work
and to social reality in her critical appraisal of American law, but
which simultaneously challenges Americans to aspire to a higher social and political morality.
Glendon's early interest in comparative family law appears to
have been sparked by her mentor, Max Rheinstein, a renowned
teacher and scholar at the University of Chicago. (In the 1960s and
1970s, Rheinstein was arguably the world's leading authority in comparative family and succession law.) After Glendon's entry into the
legal academy in 1968, following several years as an associate in the
law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago, she collaborated with
Rheinstein in producing a 194-page chapter on "Interspousal Relations" in the InternationalEncyclopedia of ComparativeLaw.' By the time
this chapter appeared, Glendon had achieved standing in her own
right as a dominant authority in comparative family law. When Rheinstein died in 1977, the year in which her first book appeared, 2 she was
well on her way to becoming one of this country's foremost comparative legal scholars, a reputation conclusively sealed with the publication of Comparative Legal Traditions, a major coursebook in the West
3
Publishing Company's American Casebook Series.
As with the 1977 volume, Glendon's other books on family law
revealed the profound changes that had taken place in legal norms
relating to marriage, divorce, family support, and parent-child relationships in the United States and Western Europe. 4 More importantly, these books were seminal studies in the sociology of law. By
1 Max Rheinstein & Mary Ann Glendon, InterspousalRelations, in THE INTERNA(Aleck Chloros ed., 1980).
2 See MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1977).
3
See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1985).
TIONAL ENCLYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW

4

See MARYANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILYAND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); MARY

ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
OF FAMILY LAW].

(1989)

[hereinafter GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION
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relying on the work of anthropologists and social historians, not to
mention her own keen sense of evolving social reality, she was able to
relate developments in family law to fundamental, albeit often imperceptible, changes that were beginning to emerge in private life and
the social economy. We read, for example, how new forms of property such as wages, social security, welfare benefits, and other entitlements influenced attitudes toward marriage, transposing it from a
relationship based on the moral unity of two-in-one-flesh to one
rooted in an ethic of personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, a development that defined modem marriage as a legal union as freely dissolved as it was freely entered into.
The power of Glendon's work on family law stems from its close
examination of the connection between law and society. In this respect, her work is descriptively rich and unfalteringly honest in its account of the belief systems and social practices that have undermined
the traditional institution of marriage as well as older definitions of
the family. (She has found it more difficult to assess the impact of
legal norms on social practices.) With the skill of a cartographer, she
has mapped out law's twentieth century geologic shift away from protecting the bonds of marriage and the unity of the family to its modem emphasis on dividing property after the breakdown of a marital
union and on looking after-all too inadequately in her view-the
needs of indigent mothers and children. She documented law's inattention to the responsibility of unmarried and divorced fathers to support their former wives and mistresses and minor children. As a
consequence, the latter have been forced to rely on government for
their essential needs, casting them into an impersonal world overseen
by huge welfare bureaucracies.
Glendon traces this change in family law in part to the emancipation of women from the so-called "housewife-marriage" and the modem tendency of both spouses to find their identities in their jobs
rather than in personal relationships or traditional institutions. As
law's traditional solicitude for the integrity of the marriage bond declined, she notes, its control over the employment relationship increased, usually in the interest of the employee. 5 On this front, she
tells us, law and society moved forward pretty much together. She
5 In the 1990s, however, the bond between employers and employees would
loosen. The decline in union membership during these years was precipitous while
corporate "downsizing" resulted in the summary discharge of tens of thousands of
employees and workers throughout the nation. For an excellent essay relating unions

and the workplace to some of Glendon's views on the proper constitution of the polity, see Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36

B.C. L. REv. 279 (1995). This article has been reprinted in Thomas C. Kohler, Civic
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concedes that this forward movement was largely inevitable and, from
a feminist perspective, not altogether unwelcome. It paralleled the
increasing pluralism of American and European society and the "ideology of tolerance"-her words-that pluralism generated, an ideology that prevented family law "from trying to articulate a common
morality." Instead, law would now "confine itself merely to defining
6
the current outer limits of permissible diversity in family matters,"
thus diminishing the distinction once made between de jure and de
facto marriage as well as between the marriage-centered family and
"familial" lifestyles rooted in various biological and social
relationships.
Where does Glendon's constitutionalism appear in all this? We
find it in the normative and comparative aspects of her work. Even as
she accepts the positive values associated with the emergence of modern family law-for example, law's emphasis on the equal rights of
husband and wife-she sees dangers in the modern tendency, accelerated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, to "ideologize"
the freedom to marry and to remarry. Paradoxically, she notes, just as
our society-or, more accurately, our law-has trivialized the significance of the marital bond, the Supreme Court has elevated the right
to marry to one of the most fundamental of constitutionally protected
liberties. Accordingly, and lamentably in her view, laws that seek to
strengthen the marriage bond or to condition a person's right to remarry on the fulfillment of obligations toward children born of a previous marriage are likely to be struck down as unconstitutional.
Glendon's constitutional perspective emerges more clearly in The
Transformation of Family Law, published in 1989 by the University of
Chicago Press. 7 In a concluding chapter, she views with dismay the
breakdown of an institution that she characterizes elsewhere as a
"seedbed of virtue,"8 that is, an important mediating structure between the individual and the state. The breakdown may not have
been caused by the Supreme Court, but it was coterminous with the
escalation of its individualistic-egalitarian jurisprudence in the last
half of the twentieth century. Boddie v. Connecticut and Zablocki v.
Redhail are examples of this jurisprudence. 9 Both cases are based on
Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, in SEEDBEDS

OF VIRTUE

131 (Mary

Ann Glendon & Daniel Blakenhorn eds., 1995).

6

GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW,

7

GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY

supra note 4, at 14.

LAW, supra note 4.

8 See SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 5.
9 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that a state may not con-

stitutionally deny persons the right to sue for divorce without payment of court fees
and service-of-process costs that they are unable to pay); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.

1998]

THE CONSTITUTIONALISM

OF MARY ANN

GLENDON

1337

the view that marriage exists for the self-fulfillment of the individual
rather than for the benefit of the family or the common good of
society.
Glendon suggests thatjudicial activism has exacerbated the crisis
of American family law. (The theme of judicial activism, by the way,
creeps increasingly into Glendon's work and becomes one of her major concerns in books and essays published in the 1990s.) She suggests in Transformation of Family Law that the constitutionalization of
family law has seriously eroded the power of local governments to
make laws for the stability of the social order, the good morals of the
community, or the needs of children from broken homes. She would
doubtless second Justice Hugo Black's dissenting opinion in Boddie.
Black wrote that the "unbounded authority in any group of politically
appointed or elected judges [to nullify such laws] would unquestionably be sufficient to classify our Nation as a government of men, not
the government of laws of which we boast."10 As just noted, Black's
view would find a louder echo in Glendon's later work.
Mary Ann Glendon nevertheless doubted law's capacity substantially to change or redirect the march of social events. First, she noted
that any "attempt to impose a single ideal of marriage becomes more
and more futile" in an age marked by increasing diversity in morals
and ideology." Second, she found that developments in the United
States paralleled those of other advanced democracies such as England, France, Germany, and Sweden, the main sources of her comparative findings and reflections. While careful to point out critical
differences in the marriage and family laws of these nations, she documented the common transnational tendency to place the family in the
service of the individual and to establish new forms of state intervention in family life. These commonalities appeared to reflect a sociocultural reality heavily resistant-or so it would seem-to law's
influence.
In comparing the family law of the United States with that of the
countries mentioned, Glendon enables Americans to measure themselves against the standards of other advanced democracies. American and European family law may well have been affected in similar
ways by twentieth century social movements, yet she found that the
legal norms of the nations under study project different images of the
374 (1978) (holding that a state could not validly deny persons the right to remarry
unless they could fulfill their legal obligations to support the children of a prior

marriage).
10
11

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 393 (Black, J., dissenting).
See Mary Ann Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as

Reflections of ChangingIdeologies, 23 AM. J. ComP. L. 1, 26 (1975).
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human person and society. The United States and Sweden, for example, seem united in placing law's primary focus on individuals, treating family members as separate and independent. These countries,
she tells us, "hold self-sufficiency up as an ideal, suggesting that dependency is somehow degrading, and implicitly denying the importance of human subjectivity." 12 In continental civil law, on the other
hand, she found a greater tendency to support the family as a unit
(reflected, for example, in family allowance policies) and to envision
the individual in a richer context of social and interpersonal relations.
As suggested at the outset, Glendon's critical approach to family
law might be defined as moral realism, one that encourages balance
between liberty and order. Her moral realism rejects absolutism. In a
multi-cultural America, she would be the last to insist on any traditional view of the marriage relationship, especially if its legal defense
would render wives and mothers less equal than husbands and fathers.
"All are engaged," she tells us, "in trying to work out an understanding
of sexual equality that takes account of women's roles in procreation
and child raising without perpetuating their subordination. '13 What
is more, she does not think that direct state intervention in family life
would repair the ills that bedevil it. She advocates here, as elsewhere,
an "ecological" approach, one that would direct its attention to nurturing an environment in which families could continue to serve as
"the only theater in which we can realize our full capacity for good or
evil, joy or suffering. '14 A holistic vision of this nature would seek to
revitalize those "seedbeds of virtue"-that is, churches, schools, neighborhoods, workplaces, and other subcultures-that would help to insulate the family against the cold bureaucracy of the state as well as
the cruelty of free market capitalism.
Glendon's moral realism also rejects the ideology of moral neutrality that she thinks infects so much of American family law, particularly at the constitutional level. She rightly reports that older family
values and virtues are still widely shared in American culture, and she
reminds us that social reality is not always what it is portrayed to be.
Strong undercurrents and countercurrents often challenge received
notions of social reality. Accordingly, in her view, law may seek to foster marital unity, spousal fidelity, and parental responsibility without
eroding individual freedom. To keep law from fostering such values-moral values if you will-is to strip law of its symbolic and didactic character. Law does not exhaust itself with its capacity to coerce.
12
13
14

Id. at 297.
GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW,

Id. at 313.

supra note 4, at 307.
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Like a constitution, ordinary law influences the way people think
about themselves. It reminds us of ideals and aspirations which if lost
would impoverish us and the communities around us.
II
In Abortion and Divorce in Western Law and Rights Talk, books reviewed in over fifty-five law journals and other periodicals (by my
count), Glendon returned to substantive themes sounded in her publications on family law' 5 and, as before, she continued to dwell on the
way we Americans talk about law, life, persons, and relationships in
the wider society. In these studies, however, and in her shorter essays
and occasional pieces dealing with religious liberty and the conditions
of American democracy, she turned more directly to constitutional
issues and with far more critical bite than in her earlier work.
In the books just mentioned, she peers into the soul of America,
again in great part by means of comparative legal analysis. She examines American and Western European law for the "stories" they tell
about their respective societies and for the messages they convey
about human character and personhood. As she reminds us in her
work on family law, law's language is important because of its capacity
to influence popular values and attitudes. When this language appears in constitutional decisions dealing with crucial social and moral
issues, it takes on even greater importance, particularly if it pretends
to represent a social reality that may not reflect reality at all. In such
cases, law distorts reality and, worse, our view of ourselves, often leading to a distortion of the meaning of liberty. In comparing the United
States with Western Europe, and occasionally with Canada, she finds
that American law talk is more absolute, more individualistic, and
more insular in its conception of social and political life than the legal
voices heard from abroad. And she makes no bones about which
voices are the morally superior ones. "American Failures, European
Challenges" is the subtitle of Abortion and Divorce in Western Law.
In Abortion and Divorce and Rights Talk, as in her recent study of
the American legal profession, 16 Glendon listens carefully to the dom15

See MARY

ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN

FAILURES, EuROPEAN CHALLENGES

(1987); MARY ANN

GLENDON, RIGHTS

TAUic

THE IM-

OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) [hereinafter GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK].
For related essays see Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom
POVERISHMENT

Language of the Constitution, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 672 (1992); Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1992) [hereinafter
Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions]; Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F.
Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991).
16 See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
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inant voices of the American judiciary, bar, and legal academy. What
she hears are voices that project a false image of the nation's identity
and its constitutional morality. It is largely the image of a society cut
off from a rich heritage rooted in denominational commitments,
neighborhood networks, local subcultures, and other forms of community and association. The image is one that has elevated liberty
into the superordinate value of our constitutional polity, thus undermining the significance of the social fabric in which our lives are
embedded.
It should be clear to anyone who has read Glendon that she is not
criticizing the language of constitutional rights as such, or for that
matter of rights generally. Any person as devoted as she is to Tocquevillian 'jurisprudence" and Madisonian constitutional theory' 7rightly understood, that is-could only celebrate the traditions of liberty and republican government bequeathed to us by the nation's
Founders. What troubles her is the "dialect" in which Americans talk
about rights. The purpose of her grand enterprise is to show how the
grammar and vocabulary of rights talk has crippled political discourse
in America. The crippling results from an obsessive fascination with
rights and liberties to the exclusion of other values that we as citizens
should also defend and cherish. The essence of her message is captured in the following passage from Rights Talk:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of
common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems
to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding personal and
civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate
that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect
of civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and
personal virtue. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important
aids to the process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits pro18
mote mere assertion over reason-giving
"This passage," wrote Suzanna Sherry, "is worth careful rereading, for
it identifies with great clarity and specificity the separate but related
pathologies that render American rights talk so paralyzing."1 9
17 See Mary Ann Glendon, PhilosophicalFoundationsof The Federalist Papers: Nature of Man and Nature of Law, 16 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POLY 23 (1992).
18 GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 15, at 14.
19 Suzanna Sherry, Rights Talk: Must We Mean What We Say? 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY

491, 492 (1992).
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The pathologies referred to are the absolutism of our law, its winner-take-all mindset, and its tendency to invade the rightful prerogatives of families and communities. Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
and Rights Talk highlight these pathologies. Roe v. Wade,20 for example, virtually reduced the meaning of liberty to unrestrained freedom
of choice. The mischief of Roe, Glendon suggests, is not that the
Supreme Court vindicated the right of a woman to procure an abortion. It was rather the Court's decision to recognize only one player
in the game by giving everything to the woman and nothing to the
unborn child. The state had no constitutional duty to protect the life
of the unborn child, no matter what the stage of pregnancy, because,
according to the Court, the fetus is not a "person" within the meaning
of the Constitution. In fact, the woman's right to end her pregnancy
was as absolute as the physician's right to define the medical procedure for killing it. Accordingly, with one blow, Glendon charged, the
Court stopped the legislatures of all 50 states from striking a better or
more creative balance between individual interests and common values. Similarly, and largely because of the Court's categorical ruling,
Roe tore apart the national community, giving rise to an uncompromising and unending face-off between opposing groups. In fomenting societal division rather than consensus, Roe rendered
virtually impossible any meaningful national dialogue on the merits of
abortion.
In Glendon's view, Roe represented a heartless and impersonal
constitutionalism. It projected an image of the human person as a
"lone rights-bearer." Persons were seen as atomistic individuals with
little or no connection to family, place, church, workplace, or community. Rights Talk repeats this theme on a wider range of issues, including controversies involving freedom of speech, religious liberty,
homosexuality, and privacy more generally. Once again, Glendon
finds the Supreme Court putting up a fence around individuals, regarding them as isolated units free to do anything they please so long
as they do no physical harm to other persons. Relevant here are certain free speech cases that vindicate expressive conduct no matter how
offensive or crude or hateful. Liberated from the restraints of the
community, self-regarding individuals need feel no obligation to society or to those around them. In short, the deafening sound of rights
talk has drowned out the voices of trust, self-discipline, compassion,
21
friendship, responsibility, and goodwill.
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 For an inspiring book of stories celebrating several of these virtues, see WILLIAmJ. BENNETT, THE BooK OF VIRTUEs (1993).
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Yet Glendon refuses to indict the judiciary as such for the absolutism found in American rights discourse. I would have thought, for
example, that she would be inclined to take the Supreme Court to
task for its decision in the flag burning case. 22 Texas v. Johnson, after
all, permits individuals to define themselves by smashing the most
cherished symbols of our national life together, vindicating expressive
individualism in the extreme, or so I would have argued. In her discussion of Johnson, however, she is less appalled by the Court's decision than by popular reactions to the flag's meaning. Americans
asked to define the meaning of the flag tended to give no-holdsbarred answers. The question "elicited passionate defenses of freedom of expression on the one hand, and equally fervent protests
against desecration of the national symbol on the other."23 In the
popular battle, she tells us, emotion prevailed over reason.
Thomas Merton died several years before many of the Supreme
Court decisions Glendon laments were handed down, but he seemed
to capture the spirit of America-and American law-in the following
lines:
We are like billiard balls bumping against each other. The American idea, which was built up in the eighteenth century, likewise assumes that is how people are. Everybody is an individual and he
operates from this center where he is completely separated from
24
everybody else, but he still obeys the traffic laws.
In the American view, Merton thought, "society works if everybody just
observes two things: a) he seeks his own interests while b) he observes
the rules."2 5 This attitude toward human nature and civil society is
undoubtedly what Glendon had in mind in tracing the American
penchant for uncompromising rights talk back to Locke, Blackstone,
and Hobbes.
She reminds us, however, that individual rights also enjoy elevated status in European constitutions, but she finds the latter also
employing the language of responsibility and sociality. Examples
abound: Germany guarantees the right to property, but "property entails obligations" just as its use "should serve the public interest"26 ;
Italy recognizes "the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual
and as a member of the social groups in which his personality finds
22 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
23 GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 15, at 110; see also Mary Ann Glendon, Reflections on the Flag-Burning Case, in FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1990, at 11-13.
24 THOMAS MERTON, THOMAS MERTON IN ALASKA 132(1988).

25

Id.

26

BASIC

LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

(CG),art. 14 [2] (1949).
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expression, and imposes the performance of unalterable duties of a
political, economic, and social nature" 27; the Council of Europe, now
composed of over 35 nations, confers on "everyone... the right to
respect for his privacy and family life," but this right may be limited by
"law [when] necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others." 2 8 Similar provisions could be cited in many other modem
constitutions, including the Constitution of Japan (1946), the Constitution of South Africa (1996), and the post-Communist constitutions
29
of Eastern Europe.
According to Glendon, Americans have read too much of Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone into the meaning of the Constitution, a
reading that impels them to insist on realizing all the rights and prerogatives associated with their perceivedautonomy and individuality.
Yet, despite its lack of any language of cooperation and responsibility,
the United States Constitution need not be so interpreted. Glendon
reminds us that the Founding Fathers assumed that guaranteed rights
would be construed in light of the public virtues, moral values, and
responsible citizenship that they took for granted when they wrote the
Constitution. As Tocqueville discovered, Americans exercised their
liberty with moderation and restraint. They filtered liberty through
the social discipline and common values of the community, which in
turn spoke through the political institutions of representative
government.
In today's culture of expressive individualism, however, Americans have virtually obliterated the line between individual liberty and
social obligation, as well as between liberty and license, and, I would
27

CONSTITUTION OF ITALY, art. 2 (1947).
28 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950,
art. 8.
29 For example, the Japanese Constitution declares that "the people . . .shall
always be responsible for utilizing [their rights] for the public welfare." KENPo, art. 12.
Article 3 of South Africa's Constitution (1996) affirms that all persons are "equally
subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship." Many Eastern European constitutions imitate the provisions of Germany's Basic Law. Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (1992), for example, declares that "parents have the
right and the duty to raise and care for their children,"just as article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1991) affirms that the "ownership [of property]
implies obligations." See also Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, supra
note 15; Donald P. Kommers, Constitution-WritingAbroad: What Lessonsfor Americans,
in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1945-1995: RIGHTS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
(Kermit L. Hall & David M. O'Brien eds., forthcoming 1998).
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add, most particularly in the area of freedom of speech. But even with
the obsessive egoism that we Americans see so much of these days,
responsible freedom and the values of sociality are still celebrated in
our society. That this benign orientation to life and politics in
America is not as prominent as it perhaps could be owes something,
Glendon suggests, to the culture of rights venerated in many decisions
of the modem Supreme Court and promoted with such moral fervor
in the legal academy, even to the point of romanticizing the values of
the First Amendment. 30
European constitutional judges and courts, by contrast, while certainly vigorous in defense of individual liberty under their respective
constitutions, have not exalted rights to the exclusion of sociality or
responsibility. They tend to envision persons as cooperative beings
and in community with others. As Germany's Federal Constitutional
Court has declared,
The image of man in the Basic Law [Germany's Constitution] is not
that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law has
decided in favor of a relationship between the individual and community in the sense of a person's dependence on and commitment
to the community, without infringing upon a person's individual
3
value. '

The balance between rights and responsibilities implied in this remark finds strong refrains in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights. In a recent free speech case, for example,
the European Court declared:
[W] hoever exercises the rights and freedoms enshrined in [the free
speech guarantees of Article 10 (2)] undertakes "duties and responsibilities." Among them-in the context of religious opinions and
beliefs-may legitimately be included an obligation to avoid as far
as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and
thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do not
contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering pro32
gress in human affairs.

As Glendon points out in various places, the European perspective on rights is heavily rooted in the concept of human dignity. To
the extent that the Supreme Court speaks of dignity as such, it tends
to identify the concept with individual rights and autonomous self30 See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FiRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
(1990).
31 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 305 (1997).
32

Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, 295 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1995).

1998]

THE

CONSTITUTIONALISM

OF MARY

ANN GLENDON

1345

determination. But dignity is not itself a right, and it is a far cry from
the concept of autonomy embedded in Supreme Court opinions. In
the European view, dignity precedes rights, which is one reason the
concept of dignity is given explicit and separate recognition in several
post-1945 modem European constitutions. Germany's Basic Law, for
example, begins by declaring that "the dignity of man shall be inviolable" and that "to respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state
authority. '3 3 Similarly, Poland's 1997 Constitution, the newest of the
post-Communist constitutions, reads: "The inherent and inalienable
dignity of persons shall constitute a source of the freedoms and rights
of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable."8' 4 There is no such
language in the U.S. Constitution.
These textual differences, of course, matter. Yet as David Beatty
has suggested, judicial review as practiced by most of the world's constitutional courts is less a matter of interpretingthe words and phrases
contained in a constitution than applying those principles of rationality and proportionality that are commonly used in determining
whether the state has unjustifiably invaded a guaranteed right8 35 Even
much of American constitutional law can be understood in terms of
these principles of rationality and proportionality. Still, one hears a
gentler voice-or dialect-emerging from the "dignitarian" jurisprudence of European constitutional courts than from the "libertarian"
decisions of the American Supreme Court, especially those decisions
that the Court has grounded in the concept of substantive due process
liberty. The pitch of the American cases is especially harsh regarding
abortion. As Glendon points out, the abortion liberty in the United
States is virtually unlimited since a woman can destroy her fetus at any
time during the course of a pregnancy unless a state chooses to bar
post-viability abortions, but even here American courts seem poised to
keep that power narrowly cabined.
33 BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GG), art. 1. The enumeration of particular guaranteed rights follows this provision.
34 THE CONSTITUTION OF POLAND, art. 30 (1997). In State v. Makwanyane and Another, South Africa's Constitutional Court underscored the importance of a constitutional clause singling out human dignity for special protection. In striking down the
death penalty, notwithstanding the absence of any constitutional provision banning it,
the Court was severely critical of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), in which the
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of capital punishment. ChiefJustice A.
Chaskalson remarked that "the difficulties that have been experienced in following
the American path.., persuade me that we should not follow this route.... Under

our constitutional order the right to human dignity is specifically guaranteed. It can
only be limited by legislation which passes the stringent test of being 'necessary.'"

State v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (6) BCLR 665, 694-95 (SA).
35 DAVID BEATTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JuICIAL REvrEw 18-23 (1994).
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European constitutional courts have been less dismissive of the
value of the fetus and less prone to see abortion as a privacy ight.
Abortion abroad tends to be viewed less as a right than as a social
policy. In European judicial cases on abortion, for example, as the
passage on the image of man from Germany's Federal Constitutional
Court indicates, we hear more about personhood, relationships, and
solidarity and less about individuality, autonomy, and disengagement.
All these values-both of liberty and solidarity-receive protection at
some level in constitutional democracies but, as Glendon reminds
Americans, the European dialect is different. The language of liberty
is of course unmistakable in European constitutionalism, but it is spoken with a stronger accent on dignity, one that accounts for the balance that European constitutionalism seeks to achieve between
sociality and individuality. In the United States, by contrast, individual
rights usually trump values grounded in sociality.
Glendon's comparative scholarship underscores this difference
between American and European law. In Abortion and Divorce in Westem Law, she found that most European constitutional courts have
been willing to sustain laws permitting abortion. Most of these laws
permit abortions early in pregnancy-usually in the first three
months-or, alternatively, for particular reasons specified by law. But
they also recognize unborn life as a fundamental value worthy of legal
protection, thus communicating the view, often through compulsory
counseling and waiting periods-requirements that American courts
have struck down-that all human life, postnatal or prenatal, is sacred. Yet, as a matter of social policy, and out of compassion for women in distress who might otherwise endanger their own lives by
illegal interruptions of pregnancy, abortion is allowed for particular
reasons or prior to a certain stage in the development of the fetus.
Germany's Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992 is especially noteworthy for its recognition of the values on both sides of the
abortion debate. (Glendon might not approve of Germany's new law,
but in my own view it does seek to recognize, even though it may not
effectively harmonize, the conflicting values of life and self-determination.) The new all-German statute dropped the penalty for abortions
performed in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, but it simultaneously removed many of the hardships and disadvantages associated
with pregnancy and childbirth. 3 6 To this end, the 1992 statute
36 Article 13 of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act amended sections
218-19 of the German Criminal Code. See, Abortion Reform Act of 1992, art. 13
StGB. Before an abortion could be performed, however, the woman would have to

produce a certificate verifying the place and date of counseling and the physician-
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amended laws dealing with social security, medical insurance, job
placement, welfare assistance, housing, and rent control.3 7 The social
supports resulting from these amendments should also be seen
against Article 6 of the Basic Law, which places "marriage and family"
under the "special protection of the state" and proclaims that "every
mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community."3 8 Accordingly, in German constitutional law, as in European
law generally, persons-as distinguished from individuals-are perceived as social beings called to shared responsibility with and on behalf of other persons.
These observations underscore two points that Glendon has
driven home in her writing on constitutional matters. First, constitutional law, like all law, plays an important educative or didactic role in
promoting a virtuous and responsible citizenry. Second, constitutional review should be exercised with due regard and respect for the
judgments of legislative majorities. She is not, however, excessively
deferential to such majorities. Indeed, her constitutionalism requires
an energetic judicial defense of the ordered liberty required by the
principle of human dignity. In her view, courts damage the quality of
democracy when rights are vindicated at the expense of civil society or
those seedbeds of virtue between the state and the individual that cultivate compassion, competence, and responsible citizenship.
IIn
More should be said about Glendon's perspective on judicial review and democracy. As noted, her quarrel is not with the principle of
judicial review. One finds in her work sturdy support for judicial review as a functional necessity in a constitutional democracy, and she
would agree that our constitutionaldemocracy has been enhanced by
the Court's vigorous defense of the American Bill of Rights. When,
however, judicial review overreaches itself, as she clearly thinks it has
in fields such as abortion, church-state relations, and family affairs, it
tends to weaken our constitutional democracy. It weakens democracy
by breaking the bonds that enrich human lives and reinforce those
seedbeds of virtue so worthy of our common respect and support.
counselor issuing the certificate could not be the same physician who would perform
the abortion. After the twelfth week of pregnancy, the woman could legally abort her
fetus only to avert a serious threat to her life or a grave impairment of her physical or
mental health.
37 For a discussion of these provisions, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10J. CoN'rmep. HEAT L.
& POL'Y 1, 12-14 (1994).
38 BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GG), art. 6.
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This breaking down of the bonds of community Glendon nicely
illustrates in a masterly Michigan Law Review essay, coauthored with
Raul F. Yanes, on "Structural Free Exercise." 39 The essay describes the
devastating results of the Supreme Court's rigid separationist interpretation of the religion clauses, an interpretation that begins with the
sweeping dogmas laid down in Everson v. Board of Education.40 In her
view, Everson, undergirded by the Supreme Court's contemporary free
exercise jurisprudence, has metastasized into something more akin to
antagonism toward religion than the religious freedom that the free
exercise clause was clearly meant to privilege. At issue here, as many
other critics of the Court's church-state cases have pointed out, is no
less than the health of the body politic. Glendon finds fault with judicial decisions that have invalidated forms of interreligious cooperation
in the public realm as well as others that have stopped church and
state from working together to resolve common problems of a purely
secular nature. 41 Some of the Court's decisions have even sown discord in communities where relative harmony had earlier prevailed,
just as in certain free exercise cases intolerance rather than tolerance
42
of diversity may well have been the result.

Glendon and Yanes point out that the Supreme Court's narrow
construction of free exercise and its broad construction of establishment have resulted in an individualistic view of religious freedom that
'43
"largely ignor[es] its associational and institutional dimensions,
suggesting "that religious experience is separable from the rest of
human life and activity." 44 In First Things they write:
What seems to have paved the way for this remarkable inversion of
meaning was the inability of Court majorities to grasp that, for mii39 See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15.
40 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
41 Among the examples cited are McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203
(1948), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Glendon and Yanes write:
Like the McCollum case that had squelched efforts at interfaith cooperation
in Illinois nearly four decades earlier, Aguilar deployed abstract separationist

logic and baseless evocations of sectarian strife to strike down a benign legislative program worked out by Congress after extensive cooperative effort
with and testimony from a wide variety of religious organizations. Moreover,
the decision seemed to place religion, alone among human activities, in a
suspect category.
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 514.
42 Examples of such decisions are School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 473 U.S.
373 (1985) and Board of Education of KiryasJoel Village SchoolDistrict v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994). See also Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 495-99.
43 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 489.

44 Id. at 485.
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lions of Americans, religious freedom is "exercised" within worshipping communities. The justices lost sight of the fact that the
religion language of the First Amendment protected individuals'
free exercise, not only when they were alone, but in their religious
45
associations and institutions.
The First Things essay summarizes the deeper and more extensive
analysis offered in the Michigan Law Review. In First Things, however,
Glendon and Yanes address their concern over the then-proposed
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), in which Congress sought
to restore the "compelling interest" test in the free exercise field that
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
appeared to reject.4 6 To most critics of the Supreme Court's religion
jurisprudence, the broad construction of the establishment clause had
excessively curtailed the realization of religious liberty and now, to
make matters worse, Smith restricted it even more by relieving government of the duty to marshal a strong-that is, compelling-justification
for a statute of general applicability that happens to impinge on a
person's free exercise right. Unlike most of Smith's critics, Glendon
and Yanes opposed the proposed Act, which Congress passed in 1993,
because "nothing it contains will affect the 'establishment
clause,' [thus freezing] into statutory form the interpretive error that
the First Amendment contains two 'clauses' with divergent purposes
that are often in tension." 47 With equal discernment they noted that
"the reference [in the Act] to 'any person's free exercise' tends to
obscure the fact that for many individuals, free exercise has a social
dimension. '48 Needless to say, this particular debate became moot
49
when the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA in 1997.
We might return briefly to the Michigan Law Review article because it offers a way out of the interpretive mess represented by the
Supreme Court's religious liberty jurisprudence. The "structural" approach to constitutional interpretation advocated in the Michigan
piece is a plea for a more holistic view of the Constitution, one that
envisions the document as a unified whole and its various provisions
and clauses as mutually reinforcing. The Supreme Court's fixation on
particular phrases and clauses of the Constitution, Glendon and Yanes
tell us, tends to diminish the unity of the Constitution, resulting in the
45

Raul F. Yanes & Mary Ann Glendon, How to Restore Religious Freedom:A Debate,

FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 47.

46
47
48
49

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Yanes & Glendon, supra note 45, at 47.
Id
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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kind of disharmony, even antagonism, that continues to define the
50
relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses.
The structural constitutionalism of the Michigan essay, of course,
is hardly new. The holistic approach to legal-and social-analysis
informs all of Glendon's work, including Transformation of Family Law,

Rights Talk, Abortion and Divorce, A Nation Under Lawyers, and her occasional essays. In one of these essays, she enumerates the prices we
have paid for a constitutionalism that ignores social context by overinflating the value of individual liberty:
In our own time, by promoting individual rights at the expense of
nearly every other social value in family law, labor law, and constitutional law, we have deprived families, churches, and other forms of
fellowship of some of their mutually sustaining influences. Certain
family-law and welfare reforms have been carried out, for example,
with little regard for the ways in which they might appear to be discouraging personal responsibility. Urban renewal programs often
carelessly wiped out entire neighborhoods and irreplaceable social
networks. A "wall of separation," erected between church and state,
made it difficult for government to benefit from the experience and
successes of religious communities in performing certain essential
51
social functions.
Many of these societal ills, Glendon tells us, stem from law's overreliance on adversarial litigation and the "winner-take-all" psychology
it inspires, a tendency Glendon finds dramatically represented in
"some forty years in pursuing an individualistic, secularist, and separa'
tionist approach to [the] religion cases. "52
As for the religion clauses, all is not hopeless, however. In the
Michigan article, Glendon and Yanes see signs of a changing interpretive perspective in the opinions of several justices, opinions that recall
50

The clause-by-clause approach to American constitutional interpretation con-

trasts sharply with the structural or holistic approach of Germany's Federal Constitu-

tional Court. In her response to Justice Antonin Scalia's essay on legal interpretation,
Glendon cited the German Court's "practice of attending consistently to the language
and structure of the entire Constitution-to the document as a whole, and to the
relationship of particular provisions to one another as well as to the overall design for

government." She also highlighted what is known in Germany as the principle of
practical concordance, an interpretive approach that requires the Federal Constitu-

tional Court to support the unity of the Constitution and harmonize conflicting provisions. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION 104-05(1997). See also Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:
A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 851-52 (1991).
51 Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Laws, and Human Community, FIRST

June-July 1990, at 28.
52

Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 536.
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the "holistic" views of Justices Bryon White and Potter Stewart of an
earlier era as well as the path-breaking dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree.53 The word structural, as she
deploys it, is used "in an organic, rather than a mechanical, sense to
refer to the relations within and among texts, and between legal and
social institutions." 54 She quotes approvingly from a public lecture of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in which he remarked, "Those who make our
laws ... serve us poorly if they do not recognize that the world in

which we live is an intricate web of relationships between people, private institutions and government at its various levels."5 5 Rehnquist's
admonition-and Glendon's-is a far cry from any attempt to run
roughshod over the liberties of individual Americans. Rather, it is to
remind Americans that majorities also have rights and that these
rights can be respected without encroaching on individual liberty. In
short, it is a reminder that constitutional and democratic themes run
through the text of the Constitution and that these themes can be
brought into harmonious balance. It means too, as Wisconsin v.
Yoder 5 6 demonstrates, that the beliefs of a religious community can be
honored, respected, and even publicly encouraged without putting
the state in a position of having to defend itself against endorsing or
establishing a religion. As Glendon and Yanes write: "A holistic reading [of the Constitution] thus suggests that individual free exercise
cannot be treated in isolation from the need of religious associations
and their members for a protected sphere within which they can provide for the definition, development, and transmission of their own
beliefs and practices." 57 They might have added that religion in its
own right is an essential ingredient of limited government since it
constitutes the most important independent source of ethics and morality by which to judge the actions of the state.
Structural constitutionalism therefore "suggests that the Bill of
Rights is not only a catalogue of negative individual liberties, but a
charter of 'positive protection' for certain structures of civil society,
notably religious organizations, community militia, and juries." In
fact, Glendon and Yanes remark that "Amendments One, Two, Six,
and Seven single them out for special treatment," suggesting that "the
Founders attached particular importance to the kinds of rights that
53 472 U.S. 38, 91(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 537.
55 Id at 537-38 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, The Adversary South, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1, 18 (1978)).

56 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 544.
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help to create conditions for the exercise of other rights."' 8 Religious
organizations and other seedbeds of virtue are found by them to be
absolutely crucial for educating citizens about their rights and obligations and for creating protective buffer zones between the individual
and the state.
IV
In this all-too-brief commentary on the constitutional aspect of
Mary Ann Glendon's work, I can only hope that I have not oversimplified or misunderstood her views. She writes with sensitivity and understanding and with a care that matches the elegance of her prose.
Her ecological perspective and comparative learning stamp her work
with freshness and clear-sightedness. With originality and courage,
she also questions the stock conventions and prevailing morality of
contemporary constitutional analysis and interpretation. Glendon's
constitutionalism cannot be classified in simplistic libertarian or communitarian terms. She defies all the common labels that pundits in
the legal academy like to pin on people. A keen sense of balance and
proportionality informs all of her reflections on life and law, which is
not the kind of mind-set that pleases people with axes to grind or who
take polar positions on some ideological continuum.
Glendon's work bears the imprint of her personal biography.
Hers has been a life-long quest for the common ground that binds
people together around shared values. This quest lies at the basis of
all her professional roles, including those of civil rights activist, legal
scholar, member of the bar, and commentator on public affairs. Without falling prey to the moral and intellectual fadism of the moment,
she has traveled a steady course between an overindulgent individualism and a repressive communalism. By honoring the legitimate values
on both sides of controversial issues, she has been a model of civility
in the marketplace of ideas. Balance is the magic word here. It best
describes her ecological approach to life, law, and society, an approach exceptionally displayed in her ardent defense of the family as
the major seedbed of individual liberty and dignity in modern society.
Indeed, no one has been more committed than she to defending the
rights of women and mothers in the workplace and at home or more
articulate than she in reminding lawmakers of their obligation to provide for the welfare of neglected children and to ensure that husbands
and fathers measure up to their family responsibilities. Glendon is by
58

Id. at 543-44.
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any measure a feminist without having succumbed to the allures of
hard-line feminism.
Little wonder that Pope John Paul II chose this loyal daughter of
the Church to head its delegation to the United Nations' Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing. The ecological or holistic
approach to life and law that marks Glendon's constitutionalism informed her negotiating role in China's Great Hall of the People. Appalled by the "slabs of ideological pork" she found "interspersed
among [the] commonsense provisions and bureaucratic boilerplate"5 9
that appeared in the conference's working documents, she pleaded
for a more balanced approach to women's issues. Apparently, these
documents were heavily influenced by old-line feminists and population control groups who emphasized sex and reproduction to the neglect of many other crucial issues. "[R] eading the drafts overall," she
wrote,
one would have no idea that most women marry, have children, and
are urgently concerned with how to mesh family life with participation in broader social and economic spheres. The implicit vision of
women's progress was based on the model-increasingly challenged
by men and women alike-in which family responsibilities are
60
avoided or subordinated to personal advancement.
She wrote that the documents barely mentioned marriage, motherhood, and the family "except negatively as impediments to women's
self-realization (and as associated with violence and oppression). "61
The health section in the draft document, she noted, "focused
disproportionately on sexual and reproductive matters, with scarcely a
glance toward nutrition, sanitation, tropical diseases, access to basic
health services, or even maternal morbidity and mortality." 62 Glendon's was a sane voice in an apparent sea of moral confusion and, in
the end, much of the language she objected to in draft document was
eliminated from Beijing's final report.
Glendon's defense of democratic representation in American
constitutionalism found echoes in Beijing. "Unfortunately," she
wrote, "there is an increasing tendency for advocates of causes that
have failed to win acceptance through ordinary democractic processes
to resort to the international arena, far removed (they hope) from
scrutiny and accountability." 63 Finally, her ecological perspective
59

Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing,FIRST

60 Id.
61 Id. at 31.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 35.
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shines through again in the observation that "human rights [should
not] be redefined and expanded to 'universalize' the highly individualistic ideologies of modernizing elites. Nor must human rights be
sharply separated from the cultural and religious contexts in which
rights are rooted and protected. ' 64 Her voice was one that the Vatican and Beijing could hardly have done without.
Mary Ann Glendon's work inside and outside of the legal academy has been driven by a set of simple propositions long honored in
our history and traditions: each individual is a unique person; each
person is endowed with dignity; human dignity is both the source and
condition of liberty; men and women are society-oriented persons; all
persons are entitled as a matter of necessity to all the social, economic, and cultural goods that human dignity requires; healthy mediating structures-seedbeds of virtue-are the true source of moral
education and responsible citizenship; and, relatedly, human flourishing requires a buffer zone of protection against the impersonalism of
the bureaucratic state and the social costs of unregulated market capitalism. Not a bad formula, I would suggest, for the renewal of American constitutional law.

64

Id. at 36.

